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Abstract In this work, we present a privacy-preserving
scheme for targeted advertising via the Internet Protocol TV
(IPTV). The scheme uses a communication model involving
a collection of subscribers, a content provider (IPTV), adver-
tisers and a semi-trusted server. To target potential customers,
the advertiser can utilize not only demographic informa-
tion of subscribers, but also their watching habits. The latter
includes watching history, preferences for IPTV content and
watching rate, which are periodically (e.g., weekly) pub-
lished on a semi-trusted server (e.g., cloud server) along with
anonymized demographics. Since the published data may
leak sensitive information about subscribers, it is safeguarded
using cryptographic techniques in addition to the anonymiza-
tion of demographics. The techniques used by the advertiser,
which can be manifested in its queries to the server, are con-
sidered (trade) secrets and therefore are protected aswell. The
server is oblivious to the published data and the queries of
the advertiser as well as its own responses to these queries.
Only a legitimate advertiser, endorsed with so-called trap-
doors by the IPTV, can query the cloud server and access
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the query results. Even when some background information
about users is available, query responses do not leak sensitive
information about the IPTV users. The performance of the
proposed scheme is evaluated with experiments, which show
that the scheme is practical. The algorithms demonstrate both
weak and strong scaling property and take advantage of high
level of parallelism. The scheme can also be applied as a
recommendation system.
Keywords IPTV · Targeted advertising · Privacy ·
Cryptography · Cloud computing
1 Introduction
The literature suggests [2] that targeting content (e.g., adver-
tisement, online content) to prospective customers is already
a huge and lucrative business. Traditional media such as TV,
radio or newspaper can do only a little to customize adver-
tisements of products or services for their customers. It is
claimed [3] that producers are more willing to send adver-
tisements of their goods to prospective customers with high
accuracy. By making use of online history, observed behav-
iors and demographics, online media allows finer customer
targeting. Therefore, marketing based on online traits and
demographics is preferred by advertising agencies aiming to
increase the benefit from advertisements. However, a major
issue is the potential violation of the privacy of individu-
als.
IPTV is an online media with potentially millions of sub-
scribers, and thus, it is a hot spot for advertising agencies
that have the incentives to analyze the data available to IPTV.
For example, changing a channel requires sending a request
to the IPTV provider, which allows for accurately track-
ing subscribers’ watching habits. This information can be
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an invaluable asset from advertising companies perspective.
From another point of view, however, it is considered as a
threat to subscribers’ privacy [4]. Therefore, exploitation of
such information for processing such as targeted advertising
is not acceptable without proper security and privacy protec-
tion.
The data collected by the IPTVare accumulating over time
and, therefore, there is an increasing motivation to outsource
data warehousing to cloud services. Such an outsourcing
can decrease IPTV expenses by mitigating the burdens of
storage, service management and expenditure on hardware
or software [5]. However, outsourcing amplifies the need
for privacy protection since storing personal and identifiable
data on such servers exacerbates privacy risks as identified
in [6].
The media attention given to cloud computing suggests
that it is gaining a considerable attention in business environ-
ments allowing for remote storage and data access, without
much deliberation for day-to-day management. Sensitive
information such as health records, emails and private pho-
tos can also be stored on cloud servers. Although data
encryption prior to outsourcing is suggested to protect pri-
vacy and prevent unauthorized cloud access [7], processing
encrypted data for secondary usage (e.g., targeted adver-
tisement based on online traits and demographics) is a
challenging task.
In our setting, the advertiser matches IPTV subscribers
with particular advertisements by mining demographics and
watching preferences data. Data mining operations are per-
formed on a remote database of subscribers’ data (e.g., kept
in a cloud server) by sending queries. Utilizing the responses
to the queries, the advertiser aims to match subscribers only
with relevant advertisements. Queries have to be encrypted
to prevent the disclosure of the strategy of the advertiser to
external parties such as the cloud server or other advertis-
ers. Thus, there is a need to query an encrypted database
with encrypted keywords. The core challenge we address
in this paper is facilitation of such operations, in the con-
text of a practical privacy-preserving targeted advertisement
scheme.
The setting here is different from most of the previous
works in the literature [2,3], whereby the IPTV provider
(i.e., controller of the database) is also in charge of data
processing and advertisement selection. Naturally, in such
context subscriber privacy and advertising strategy secrecy
are not major concerns. Nevertheless, use of private data
for secondary processing requires both the consent of the
user and proper precautions such as anonymization and
encryption. Indeed, those in charge of data management
are not necessarily trusted, independent from whether they
are IPTV employees or third parties. Therefore, one must
assume that the server deployed to hold subscribers’ data
is not fully trusted and potentially the data or its manage-
ment is outsourced to a so-called honest-but-curious third
party, where the server does not modify the message content
and flow, but may analyze them to infer additional informa-
tion.
In our setting, an entity called IPTV collects data about its
customers called subscribers, keeps the data on an external
cloud server and authorizes designated advertisers to mine
the data subject to not violating the customers’ privacy. The
authorized advertisers can send targeted advertisements to a
subset of the subscribers that satisfies the constraints imposed
by the advertiser. The constraints for selecting the target
subset of subscribers are given via a set of keywords, and
only those subscribers satisfying these constraints receive
the advertisement. The sensitive information of subscribers
is hidden both from the advertisers and from the cloud server.
We also consider the case, in which some background infor-
mation about the statistics of the subscribers is known by
a malicious advertiser. The queries of honest advertisers
may carry sensitive information about the advertiser strat-
egy, and therefore, keeping the queries secret from the cloud
server is another important aspect of the model discussed
here.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section (Sect. 2), we review the related works on search-
able encryption schemes and secure targeted advertising. In
Sect. 3, we outline the contributions of this work. Section 4
provides the entities involved and formalize the secure tar-
geted advertisement problem. The preliminary information
such as data filtering and data hiding techniques is pro-
vided in Sect. 5. The privacy requirements are formalized
in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, we provide a detailed description of
the proposed scheme. Section 8 explains a key technique
to provide stronger protection for the case, where adver-
sary has some background knowledge on the model. The
computation of collaborative filtering over encrypted data
is explained in Sect. 9. In Sect. 10, we provide the security
guarantees. In Sect. 11, we analyze the performance of the
method using communication and computation costs. We
discuss the results from our extensive set of experiments in
Sect. 12. We discuss some future directions and conclude in
Sect. 13.
2 Related work
The cloud server is not a fully trusted entity, and therefore, the
subscribers’ data must be anonymized prior to outsourcing.
One particular anonymization technique suggests to cluster
the subscribers that have close demographics and watch-
ing traits. Then the representatives of these clusters would
be placed in the cloud server and the advertisers can use
these summaries to match the relevant subscribers with their
advertisement portfolio. The technique is similar to the k-
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anonymity [8] algorithm, but hardly the best option in our
application scenario for many reasons: (i) clustering leaks
the information of some subscribers, (ii) the advertisers have
to use static clusters formed by the IPTV, (iii) IPTV cannot
control who access/utilize the data and (iv) loss of accuracy.
Since leaking subscribers information is the most crucial
problem from the privacy perspective, more robust solutions
are needed.
Safeguarding private information requires that sensitive
data (and associated searchable index file) be encrypted
before outsourcing. However, data encryption hinders tradi-
tional data utilization techniques based on keyword search.
Considering large number of users and documents, it is
crucial for the search service to facilitate fast and efficient
multi-keyword queries.1
Many searchable encryption schemes in the literature
focus on single keyword search operation. In the public key
cryptography setting, Boneh et al. [9] presented the first
searchable encryption construction using public key cryp-
tosystem to perform search on encrypted data. Later, Wang
et al. [10] described a ranked keyword search method over
encrypted cloud data. In this work, the server learns the
relevance order of documents that contain a specific key-
word, and it is only limited to single keyword search queries.
Several works on multi-keyword search that enable conjunc-
tive and disjunctive search options exist [11–14], but these
schemes incur large overhead in computation and communi-
cation costs. A recent work by Cash et al. [15] introduces a
searchable encryption scheme that supports multi-keyword
search operation over encrypted database. While due to scal-
ability the scheme is suitable for big data applications, it does
not allow to rank the responses based on their relevancy to a
given query.
Wang et al. [16] proposed an efficient scheme for conjunc-
tive keyword-based search. In their solution, a searchable
index is generated for each document that represents the
keywords in those documents. Via suitable application of
cryptographic hash functions, they obtain indexes and trap-
doors that allow secure searching for keywords in the index
file. However, the original scheme in [16] also does not cope
with the problem of ranking the query responses in a rele-
vancy order.
Our previous work [1], inspired from Wang et al. [16],
utilizes a keyed hash function (HMAC) to map keywords
in a subscriber’s data to a sequence of r -bit indexes using a
secret key known only to the IPTV. A similar approach exists
in [17] for multi-keyword search over encrypted data. Adver-
tisers must in advance obtain the so-called secure trapdoors
from the IPTV, which allow searching the corresponding
keywords within the subscribers’ data. Since those trap-
1 Multi-keyword (or multi-predicate) queries are essential to find data-
base entries that are relevant to all keywords in the query.
doors are generated using the IPTV’s secret key, the server
cannot learn the keywords in the advertiser’s query. The
proposed solution addresses relevant security and privacy
requirements of interactive TV [18], which are also applica-
ble in the scenario here. However, returning pseudonyms
as done in [1] may disclose information about subscribers
if the advertiser has background knowledge about the sub-
scribers or if the cloud server knows the statistics of the data
set. Further countermeasures are needed in that case. In the
remainder, we propose one solution that addresses all those
issues.
3 Contributions
Extending the basic scheme in [1], we provide an efficient
solution that resists attacks even when some background
knowledge is available. In the new scheme, the advertiser
does not learn the pseudonyms of matching subscribers,
who will ultimately receive a given advertisement. We also
account for malicious advertisers that have background
knowledge of the frequencies of the keywords in the data
set. We adopt an aggregate data release method that protects
the privacy of subscribers in the presence of background
knowledge. Thus, the proposed method provides an effi-
cient setting that facilitates data mining operations on a
secure targeted advertisement application without violating
the privacy of the IPTV subscribers and advertisers. We
also enhance the formal definitions and provide an analysis
showing that the proposed scheme satisfies these require-
ments.
We alleviate the risk of sensitive information leakage due
to background information via the following countermea-
sures:
Anonymization: Subscriber’s demographic information is
anonymized, and therefore, re-identification of sub-
scribers is difficult. Furthermore, the outsour-
ced data set is obfuscated by introducing fake profiles,
which eliminates the correlation of original data set sta-
tistics with the statistics of the obfuscated data set used
in the cloud server.
Encryption: The demographic information (e.g., age, gen-
der, occupation) about subscribers is encrypted via
homomorphic encryption techniques [19] so that the
cloud server can perform calculations directly over the
encrypted data without decrypting it.
Aggregate data release: In case background information
about the subscribers is available, the server returns
only aggregate information on the set of matching
subscriber profiles, in which sensitive information is suf-
ficiently diverse. That is, the advertiser receives only
aggregated demographic information for the matching
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subscribers along with the total number of matches.
If the number of matching results is sufficiently high,
the matching data are not considered sensitive and the
aggregated data are released. Otherwise, the aggre-
gated result is not released except for the number
of matching profiles. In the latter case, the advertiser
still learns the number of recipients of a particular
advertisement.
The benefits of the proposed scheme are multifold: (i)
The IPTV is partially relieved of management cost and
processing of data, (ii) advertiser’s mining techniques are
less exposed to the cloud server, (iii) data mining required
for targeted advertising can be performed by advertising par-
ties that have the relevant expertise and tools and (iv) the
IPTV can generate additional revenue from subscribers’ data
by ensuring sufficient data protection safeguards in comply
with relevant legislation, such as EC Directive 95/46 2 [20].
The scheme can also be applied when the advertiser is in
fact a subdivision within the IPTV (e.g., private cloud). In
this case, the IPTV has robust data protection practices that
can meet the relevant legislation, namely sensitive data are
encrypted; data used for targeted advertisement include only
necessary, anonymized information about the subscribers;
and access control to data can be exercised in a fine-grained
manner.
Another contribution of this work is the capability of
secure collaborative filtering. Utilizing collaborative filter-
ing, the IPTV can predict the preferences of the subscribers
and use these predictions to send recommendations. Hence,
the proposed scheme is not only an advertising scheme but
also a recommendation system.
While the primitive adopted in our proposal is an efficient
privacy-preserving keyword search, our main contribution
is not a novel keyword search method, but a comprehensive
solution for privacy-preserving targeted advertisement appli-
cation in an IPTV setting.
Lastly, we implement and test the proposed scheme on
both real and synthetic data sets, which show that the scheme
is suitable for practical usage. We show that the proposed
method provides a technique for advertisers to evaluate rel-
evant prediction values about potential customers.
4 The problem statement
The proposed scheme aims to send targeted advertisements
to the IPTV subscribers. We begin by describing the entities
in our system together with their goals and knowledge.
2 95/46/EC requires subscribers’ informed consent and proper data
protection techniques such as encryption and anonymization before dis-
closure and/or processing.
4.1 Entities
Following the terminology introduced in EC Directive
95/46 [20], we assume that there are four entities in our sys-
tem, namely data controller (IPTV service provider), data
subjects (subscribers), data processor (cloud server) and
recipient (advertiser).
Data controller (IPTV) Data controller is defined as any
natural or legal person which determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data. In our setting,
the data controller is the IPTV, which is an entity that pro-
vides content to subscribers. It collects information about
subscribers’ demographics and watching habits, which are
stored in a database. Each individualized entry, called sub-
scriber profile, is considered private information. Statistics of
subscriber profiles in aggregate form can be released as long
as individual entries cannot be recovered from the released
information. When it is considered as its legitimate interest,
the data controller is willing to utilize any type of information
which does not violate the privacy of individual subscribers
for secondary processing. Furthermore, the data controller
aims to reduce management costs by outsourcing database
storage, backup and management issues to a third party. Out-
sourcing can lead to data protection risks, and therefore, the
data controller should conform to privacy regulations [20].
Data subject (subscriber) Data subject is an identifiable
personwho can directly or indirectly be identified, in particu-
lar by reference to factors specific to his physical, economic,
cultural or social identity [20]. In our setting, the data subjects
are the subscribers, which are the customers of the IPTV (i.e.,
the data controller). Privacy-preserving data mining opera-
tions are applied on the encrypted subscriber profiles, and
only the most related subscribers receive an advertisement
from the advertiser. The privacy of the subscriber profiles
is protected throughout the scheme utilizing several crypto-
graphic techniques.
Data processor (cloud server) Data processor is defined
as any entity which processes personal data on behalf of the
controller [20]. In our setting, the cloud server (CS for short)
is the data processor which is a professional entity that offers
computing and storage services to any party according to
specifications provided by the said party. The CS does not
deviate from the provided specification, but curious to infer
any information from the use of its services. This behavior of
the server can be exercised on legal basis bymaking an agree-
ment with the data controller. We assume that it is against the
business interest of the CS to collude with any entity against
other entities to violate the privacy of any individual since it
is legally responsible by the 95/46/EC directive for any such
violation. As such, the CS is what is known as “honest-but-
curious” entity.
Recipient (advertiser)Recipient is any person or authority
to whom data are disclosed. The recipients are the advertisers
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which are entities that analyze demographics and watch-
ing habits of the subscribers and map the advertisements
accordingly. Advertisements are generated based on a private
advertiser strategy (e.g., data mining rules/techniques) that
requires information about the target subscribers as input.
Therefore, the advertiser is willing to utilize any database
that contains subscriber profiles, such as a database gener-
ated by the IPTV. Since mining rules can reveal information
about the advertiser’s strategy, the advertiser wants to keep
those rules secret.
4.2 Framework of interaction
The general framework is illustrated in Fig. 1. The IPTV pro-
vides personalized program contents to the subscribers and
collects information about them. In order to reduce the man-
agement costs, the IPTVoutsources its databasemanagement
to a CS. Since CS is managed by third parties, the database
canonly be stored in a formwhichdoes not violate the privacy
of individual subscribers, for example after anonymization
and encryption. Furthermore, the CS should not be able to
perform useful mining queries without the assistance and the
permission of the IPTV. Any prior IPTV assistance should be
useful only to the designated entities. Moreover, the result of
an advertiser query should not uniquely identify a subscriber.
Hence, the actual attributes of the matching results should
return only if the number of matching subscribers is suffi-
ciently high. Otherwise, only aggregated information should
be returned.
The advertiser obtains access to the database stored on the
CS and perform data mining analysis using assistance from
the IPTV. In the proposed solution, the database is stored
in encrypted form on a CS, and therefore, the advertiser
needs certain trapdoor information generated by the IPTV
in advance. This trapdoor information should not be trans-
ferable. In addition, since the advertiser’s mining rules are
considered trade secrets, the CS should not be able to infer
any information about advertiser’s queries. After learning the
data mining results from the CS, advertiser sends the adver-
tisement together with the corresponding list of subscribers
to the IPTV.
The CS in advance obtains protocol specification from
the IPTV, and according to this specification, it responds to
the requests of the authorized advertisers. Throughout these
interactions, theCSdoes not colludewith any entity to violate
another entity’s secret or private information. Furthermore,
it does not deviate from the provided specifications.
5 Preliminaries
Next, we consider some of the well-known approaches used
in data mining community for filtering, anonymizing and
obfuscating the data.
5.1 Data filtering techniques
The data mining algorithms for filtering data can be useful in
matching prospective subscribers with advertisements. Intu-
itively, these techniques filter out subscribers, whowould not
be interested in an advertisement or whose interests would
not exceed a certain threshold. Other methods or constraints
can also be applied for selecting the set of advertisement
receivers, as well. This may depend on the time of the day or
Fig. 1 General framework of directed advertising service
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season (e.g., holiday, summer). These are natural constraints
that can be applied in a straightforward manner that is in
line with sector-specific practices. Privacy implications in
these methods are not identified and thus not addressed in
this paper.
5.1.1 Content-based filtering
Each advertisement can be described by some attributes or
characteristics of the product (or service), which are the sub-
ject of the advertisement. The advertiser can use a similarity
metric between the advertisement attributes and attributes of
the IPTV content to predict subscribers’ potential interest in a
specific advertisement. The advertiser uses a public database
to obtain the attributes of the IPTVcontent (e.g., fromamovie
database for the movies offered as video-on-demand service
by the IPTV). A similarity metric between the attributes of
the IPTV content and the advertisement attributes is deter-
mined by the advertiser, specifics of which are beyond the
scope of this work.
In content-based filtering, while utilizing the similarity
metric, the advertiser calculates a prediction for subscribers’
potential interest in a given advertisement. The similarity
function S(x, y) produces a real number in the range [0, 1],
where similarity between x and y increases as S(x, y) gets
higher. Consider an advertisement c, which has the assumed
nonzero similarities to the IPTV contents (m1,m2, . . . ,mσ ).
Then the prediction for the interest of a subscriber s on the
advertisement c can be calculated as [21]:
Pc,s =
∑σ
i=1
(Rs,mi · S(mi , c)
)
∑σ
i=1 S(mi , c)
, (1)
where Rs,mi is the interest score of the subscriber s on the
IPTV content mi . Since the interest of an individual sub-
scriber on a specific IPTV content is not available for privacy
protection, the prediction for a subscriber cannot be com-
puted on individual basis.However,we can instead determine
the required interest levels on certain IPTV contents, which
show sufficiently high similarities to the advertisement c.
Then, the subscribers that show sufficiently high interest on
these IPTV contents can be targeted for the advertisement c.
To this end, the advertiser defines a rule that determines the
query content.
Example 1 Suppose that an advertisement for a perfume
brand which is advertised with a famous actress will be sent
to the subscribers who watch all the movies of that actress.
For a high prediction value for the interest of prospected sub-
scribers, the advertiser computes the desired level of interest
on the movies by the actress. The rule is then, “subscribers
who watch all the movies of that actress.” A single query
that contains the trapdoors for all the movies by that actress
will determine the subscribers who will be the target of the
advertisement.
Example 2 Following Example 1, if the advertiser defines
the rule as “subscribers who watch and like at least four
movies of the given actress,” then a separate query for each
of her movies will be sent to the cloud server along with the
anonymized rule which is “find out the profiles who match at
least four of the queries with a certain relevancy score.” Only
the subscribers, whose relevancy scores for at least four of
such movies are higher than a threshold, will be the targets
of this advertisement.
5.1.2 Collaborative filtering
Collaborative filtering [22] can be used to recommend a new
movie or content in IPTV services such as video-on-demand,
and thus, it is a type of advertising, where the IPTV itself
can be the advertiser. It is based on the preferences of other
subscribers with similar watching preferences.
Suppose that the advertiser has a catalog of K movies and
he can query the cloud server to find the subscribers who
watched and rated the movies in its catalog. The advertiser’s
aim is to find potential subscribers to recommend a movie
m. To find such a subscriber s, who has not watched m yet
and is likely to enjoy it, the advertiser establishes a similarity
relation with other subscribers over the movies commonly
watched and rated. Pearson correlation [23], ρ, is used to
find such a similarity between two subscribers s and u as
follows:
ρ(s, u) =
∑
j∈J (Rs, j − R¯s) · (Ru, j − R¯u)
√∑
j∈J (Rs, j − R¯s)2 ·
∑
j∈J (Ru, j − R¯u)2
,
(2)
where J is the set of movies which are rated by both sub-
scribers, Rl, j is the rating of subscriber l on a movie j , R¯l
is the average rating of a subscriber l for the movies in J ,
and l ∈ {s, u}. The result will be a real number in the range
[−1, 1] indicating negative correlation and perfect match,
respectively. The Eq. (3) is used to predict the rating of sub-
scriber s on a movie m /∈ J
P(s,m) = R¯s +
∑
ui∈U ρ(s, ui ) · (Rui ,m − R¯ui )∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|
, (3)
where U is the set of subscribers who rate movie m, s /∈ U
and Rl, j and R¯l are as defined above.
Example 3 Suppose that advertiser wants to find out sub-
scribers to recommend the animated movie “How to Train
YourDragon,”which is similar to “Madagascar 3” and “Kung
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Fu Panda 2.”3 First, advertiser sends three query words, each
of which contains the trapdoor for the corresponding movie.
Inspecting the matching profiles and their relevance scores,
the cloud server calculates the prediction for the rating for
“How to Train Your Dragon” for those subscribers who have
not watched it, but have watched the other twomovies. Alter-
natively but less accurately, the advertiser forms two queries,
one of which contains the trapdoors for all three movies and
the other contains only those for “Madagascar 3” and “Kung
Fu Panda 2.” The cloud server finds out subscribers who
have not watched “How to Train Your Dragon,” but given
high scores to the other two if there are sufficient numbers
of other subscribers who rated all three movies with high
scores.
5.2 Data anonymization
We use the Cornell Anonymization Toolkit [24], designed by
Cornell Database Group at Cornell University for anonymiz-
ing published data set to restrict the disclosure of records
against different types of attacks.
In our method, described in Sect. 7.2, we assume that the
IPTV anonymizes the data before publishing it in the cloud
server. To observe howmuch information can be leaked after
anonymization of the data, we apply the Cornell Anonymiza-
tion Toolkit (CAT) on the real data of the MovieLens data
set [25].
CAT anonymizes data with techniques which generalize
nonsensitive attribute values into value ranges specified by a
user. This toolkit provides an ability to estimate the disclo-
sure risk of each record in anonymized table based on user’s
assumptions about an adversary’s background knowledge. In
our experiments, we utilize the l-diversity method provided
by the CAT.
Intuitively, if an anonymized block of data is l-diverse,
there are at least l well-represented values for each sensitive
attribute. An adversary cannot infer the sensitive informa-
tion from an l-diverse data since there are at least l possible
choices.
The anonymization method provides the anonymity of the
subscribers against the advertisers. In the next section, we
propose a method that obfuscates the data set in order to hide
the sensitive content of the queries from the cloud server.
5.3 Obfuscation
A cloud server might have some background knowledge
about the statistics of the IPTV’s data set. In this case, the
3 Similarity among movies can be determined by the advertiser in any
arbitrary way by inspecting a public movie database such as IMDB.
For instance, the movies by the same studio can be considered highly
similar as in the example above.
cloud server can learn or estimate someof the keywords in the
queries if the results correlatewith the statistics. For instance,
in theMovieLens data set [25], about 72% of subscribers are
male which is the only attribute that occurs in such a high
frequency. When the result of a query is such that 72% of
the data set is matched, then the cloud server can infer that
the query contains “Male” keyword. In order to break the
correlation between the original known statistics and the sta-
tistics of the query results, we propose obfuscating the data
by insertion of fake profiles. The IPTV analyzes the statis-
tics of the data set and generates a number of fake profiles
accordingly. Since the fake profiles that are inserted to the
data set are indistinguishable from the genuine profiles, the
cloud server cannot correlate the data set statistics with the
query results. However, the statistical results that the adver-
tiser receives do not include the fake profiles. The method
for the generation of fake profiles is discussed in Sect. 7.5.
6 Privacy requirements
A privacy-preserving advertising scheme should satisfy cer-
tain privacy requirements in order to protect the privacy
of the advertisers’ queries and the subscribers’ data. Intu-
itively, the searchable encrypted index file of the subscribers’
anonymized data should not leak sensitive information about
the subscribers while the private queries of the advertisers
should not leak sensitive information such as the queried
terms. We provide formal privacy definitions for a privacy-
preserving targeted advertising scheme. The proofs that
indicate our proposed scheme is privacy-preserving are given
in Sect. 10.
Definition 1 (Trapdoor nontransferability) A privacy-
preserving targeted advertising scheme provides trapdoor
nontransferability, if an advertiser cannot apply search using
a trapdoor that is purchased by another advertiser, without
revealing either the query terms or the private key of the
advertiser that owns the trapdoor.
Definition 2 (Access control) A privacy-preserving targeted
advertising scheme provides access control if any entity that
is not registered to the IPTV cannot impersonate a registered
advertiser.
Definition 3 (Statistical privacy) Let an adversary have the
information of occurrence frequencies of each keyword in the
data set. A privacy-preserving targeted advertising scheme
provides statistical privacy, if it is hard to determine the key-
words encoded in a query by such an adversary with this
a-priory knowledge.
The following security definitions on searchable encryp-
tion, provided bellow for completeness, are due to Curtmola
et al. [26].
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The search pattern is the frequencyof the queries searched.
It can be found by checking the equality between two queries.
Definition 4 (Search pattern (Sp)) Let {Q1, . . . , Qn} be a
list of queries. Search pattern Sp is an n × n binary matrix,
where
Sp(i, j) =
{
1, if Qi = Q j
0, otherwise.
Intuitively, any deterministic query generation method
reveals search pattern.
Definition 5 (Access pattern (Ap)) is the collection of data
identifiers that contains search results of an advertiser query.
Let Li be the keyword list of Qi and R(Li ) be the col-
lection of the identifiers of data elements that match with
keyword list Li , then Ap(Qi ) = R(Li ).
Definition 6 (History (Hn)) Let D be the data set of sub-
scribers’ information andQ = {Q1, . . . , Qn} be a collection
of n consecutive queries. The n-query history is defined as
Hn(D,Q).
Definition 7 (Trace (γ (Hn))) Let C = {C1, . . . ,Cl} be the
set of encrypted subscriber data, id(i) be the identifier of the
ith subscriber and |Ci | be the size of Ci . Furthermore, let
||Q j || be the number of keywords in query Q j , sig(Q j )
be the digital signature of query Q j , |sig(Q)| be the size
(i.e., modulus) of the signature method, κ be the number of
attributes in a subscriber data, I be the searchable index and
||I|| be the number of all elements, fake and genuine, in I.
The trace of Hn is defined as
γ (Hn) = {(id(1), ..., id(l)), (|C1|, ..., |Cl |), |sig(Q)|,
(||Q1||, . . . , ||Qn||), κ, ||I||, Sp(Hn), Ap(Hn)}.
We allow to leak the trace to an adversary (e.g., the IPTV
in this case) and guarantee no other information is leaked.
Definition 8 (View (v(Hn))) is the information that is acces-
sible to an adversary from a history Hn . Let sig(Q) be
the list of the signatures of queries in Q and, id(i) and
Q are as defined above. The view of Hn is defined as:
v(Hn) = {(id(1), . . . , id(l)),C, I,Q,sig(Q)}.
Definition 9 (Semantic security) A cryptosystem is seman-
tically secure, if for all probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithms (PPTA) there exists a simulator S such that given the
trace of a history Hn , S can simulate v(Hn) with probability
1 − , where  is a negligible probability.
Intuitively, all the information accessible to an adversary
(i.e., view of the n-query history) can be constructed from
the trace that is allowed to leak.
Definition 10 (Privacy-preserving targeted advertising
scheme) An advertising scheme is called privacy-preserving
under the semantic security model, if it provides: semantic
security, statistical privacy, trapdoor nontransferability and
access control.
7 Construction
Weprovide the details of the proposedmethod in this section.
7.1 Data model
The data model we use in the proposed scheme is a generic,
keyword-basedmodel. Any attribute or feature is represented
by a keyword in the model. Specifically, for every subscriber,
we create a profile that basically consists of keywords corre-
sponding to his/her demographics and watching preferences.
For example, attributes such as gender, age, occupation and
the IPTV content being watched can be represented through
specific keywords. The collection of profiles for all sub-
scribers in the IPTV service forms the so-called searchable
index file.
Since watching preferences should incorporate the infor-
mation about how much a certain IPTV content is preferred
by a subscriber, the index for watching preferences contains
the ranking level for a particular content. For the ranked
search, i.e., the relevancy of the profiles to the query, we use
η rank levels such that the higher the rank level, the higher the
relevancy (e.g., more frequently watched). The construction
of η-ranked search is described in Sect. 7.2.
In order to test the accuracy of the proposed method, we
used a publicly available real data set, MovieLens [25]. We
provide the properties of the real data set as an example to
show how a database can be represented in our data model.
Real Data. MovieLens data set [25] is a widely used pub-
lic database which is collected by the GroupLens Research.
We use “Movielens 1M” data set, which consists of three
files: users, ratings and movies, where there are 1,000,209
ratings (in 1–5 scale) from 6040 users on 3900 movies.
The users file contains demographic information about
users/subscribers in the following form:
[User I D,Gender, Age, Occupation, Z I P-code].
The values for Age attribute are provided in range: {“Under
18”, “18–24”, “25–34”, “35–44”, “45–49”, “50–55”, “56+”}.
The values for occupation can be one of the following
21 alternatives: academic/educator, artist, clerical/admin,
college/grad student, customer service, doctor, executive/
managerial, farmer, homemaker, student, lawyer, program-
mer, retired, sales/marketing, scientist, self-employed, tech-
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nician/engineer, tradesman, unemployed, writer and other.
The ZIP code is a five digit integer indicating user’s ZIP
code. The rating file contains information about ratings in
the form: [User I D, MovieI D, Rate, T imestamp]. Rat-
ings are made on a 5-star scale, where values are integer
numbers in the interval of [1,5] and correspond to our rank-
ing levels indicating how much a content is preferred by an
individual.
While we use the MovieLens data set to test the keyword
probability distributions and accuracy rates of the method
on a real data set, we also test the method on a larger-scale
problem using a synthetic data set for testing the efficiency
and scalability. The details of the synthetic data set and the
test results are provided in Sect. 12.1.
The proposed data model is not rigid and does not impose
any restriction on our solution. The demographic features and
watching preferences can be modified and extended to real-
world scenarios. For example, the entire household cannot
be considered as a single individual (i.e., Female or Male).
To provide more precise advertising services, it is better for
the IPTV to know each member of household and follow
their watching habits (e.g., when the IPTV observes that car-
toons are being watched in the morning, it infers that there
are children in the household). Additional categories such as
family, children and adults can be defined for improving the
precision of targeted advertisements. Identifying categories
of households according to watching histories and follow-
ing their watching habits can be done by the IPTV. Our data
model can incorporate such a modification.
7.2 Index generation
The solution is inspired by the construction in [16]. Themain
idea is to represent each database record as a binary string
referred to as index entry. Different from the method used
in [16], we add ranking capability to the search method. To
accommodate η-ranked search, each record is expanded to η
index entries. Without loss of generality, there are five levels
of rating in the MovieLens data set assigned by the sub-
scribers to the movies, all of which can be captured in our
data model.
Subsequently, index entry for each database record is
cloned η times, once for each rank level. In the case of the
real data set, each clone of the subscriber record contains
all the demographic information of the subscriber. How-
ever, according to the given rate, the names or genres of
the movies are included only in the clones that exceed the
minimum rate of that rank level. For example, while a low
rank genre such as “horror” is only indexed in Rank 1 (e.g.,
rarely watched), a high rank genre like “comedy” can be
indexed in multiple ranks such as, Rank 3, Rank 2 and
Rank 1, according to the given ratings. Our intention for
such a ranking system is that the advertisements targeting the
subscribers that at least occasionally watch a genre should
also be sent to the subscribers that frequently watch that
genre.
While only index generation for rank 1 is described in
the work, the indexes for other ranks are generated in an
analogous way. The secure index is encoded using a keyed
hash-basedMessage Authentication Code (HMAC) [27]. An
HMAC function is a cryptographic hash function in com-
bination with a secret cryptographic key. In the proposed
model, it is not necessary to decrypt the secure index; hence,
an efficient one-way encoding such as an HMAC func-
tion is more suitable compared to more costly encryption
operations.
The IPTV selects an HMAC key, which is used to gen-
erate the secure index. Note that the same key is used for
all the entries in the index, including the new entries added
subsequently. However, for security reasons, the private key
can be updated periodically, in which case the secure index
is to be regenerated for the entire data set. For each profile,
the maximum number of fields is limited by m. From this
point onward, we name these fields as keywords and each
database record as a profile. A profile may have less than m
keywords.
Suppose a given profile at a given rank contains keywords
{w1, . . . , wn}, where n ≤ m. The IPTV generates the corre-
sponding rank index (binary string) by computing the l-bit
HMAC hi of each keyword wi (HMAC: {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l ).
Let
hi = hr−1i , . . . , h1i , h0i (4)
be the base 2d representation of hi (l = rd). Using the hi
values of a keyword wi , the IPTV applies a reduction opera-
tion and computes a binary string (keyword trapdoor) Ti as,
Ti = (T r−1i , . . . , T 1i , T 0i ), (5)
where
T yi =
{
0, if hyi = 0
1, otherwise.
(6)
The index entry for the jth profile at a given rank is
I j = ni=1Ti , (7)
where  denotes bitwise product.
The generated records have the form
(
id( j), I rank_1j , . . . , I
rank_η
l
)
,
where I rank_kj is the index of the jth subscriber’s profile at
rank k and id( j) is an anonymized pseudonym for the jth
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subscriber. The searchable index I is the set that contains
the index entry records of all the profiles. The IPTV sends
the searchable index I to the CS.
The proposed system is suitable for updates in the data set.
The addition of new subscribers to the system can be han-
dled without changing the existing entries. Each subscriber’s
information is stored in a separate entry of the secure index,
and it is independent from the other entries; hence, new sub-
scribers can trivially be added or existing subscribers can be
removed from the secure index without changing the data of
other subscribers. Similarly, the proposed scheme does not
use a predefined keyword dictionary set, and hence, any new
keyword can trivially be added and used in the system by just
applying the HMAC function and bitwise product operation
as shown in Eq. (7).
In some settings, some subscribers may prefer to receive
only few advertisements that come from a specific, small set
of advertisers. IPTV may sell different subscription options
such as “premium subscriber” and “classical subscriber,”
where premium subscribers receive advertisements from a
restricted group of advertisers, while classical subscribers
receive from a broader range. A trivial solution for this prob-
lem is to generate a different index for each subscriber set.
Each index will be generated using only the attributes of the
subscribers in the corresponding set, and advertisers can only
apply search in the sets that corresponds to their access rights.
This setting may require indexing some subscribers in multi-
ple indexeswhich creates additional computation and storage
costs aswell as possible privacy implications.Wedid not con-
sider the problem of multiple subscriber sets in this work and
leave privacy and efficiency issues of this problem as a future
direction.
7.3 Query index generation and oblivious search on the
database
The IPTV generates a trapdoor per each keyword, and an
advertiser obtains the trapdoors for any set of keywords in
the database entries from the IPTV. Later, the advertiser can
generate a query using any subset of the purchased trapdoors
and submit this query to the CS.
In the index generation scheme, multi-keyword (i.e., con-
junctive keywords) queries can be efficiently constructed,
resulting in an r -bit binary sequence independent of the num-
ber of keywords in the query. A multi-keyword query index
of δ keywords, {w1, . . . , wδ}, is the bitwise product of the
corresponding trapdoors {T1, . . . , Tδ}:
I q = δi=1Ti = qr−1 . . . q0.
A query from the advertiser to the CS is such an r -bit
binary sequence known as query index, and search is done
only by r -bit comparisons. The result is a list of subscriber
identifiers (id(i)) such that the corresponding index value of
a subscriber matches with the query. An index entry, Ik =
jr−1 . . . j0 in the list, matches with a query index, I q =
qr−1 . . . q0 if the index entry (Ik) has 0 for all the bits, for
which the query index has 0 as shown in Eq. (8).
result (Ik, I
q) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
match if∀i, qi = 0 ⇒ ji = 0,
not match otherwise.
(8)
In the case of disjunctive queries, the trapdoors for
query keywords are sent separately; therefore, a separate
result is generated for each keyword in the query. The
corresponding results need to be combined with other
search results by appropriate operations such as union and
subtraction.
Results of thematching records can be returned in a ranked
manner. The CS returns separate anonymized id lists for each
rank level (e.g., seldom, average and frequent ranks).
In the case, where a stronger privacy is required, for
example due to existence of background information, only
statistical data are returned as explained in the subsequent
sections.
In the proposed method, the CS is oblivious to the actual
outsourced data since the outsourced information is limited
to anonymized pseudo-identifiers of subscribers and the cor-
responding secure searchable index entries per each rank,
as
(
id(i), I rank_1i , . . . , I
rank_η
i
)
.
The queries are also in the same structure with the secure
index, and therefore, the CS cannot learn the queried key-
words from the r -bit binary querywithout knowing the secret
key used in the cryptographic hash computation. Hence,
the CS is oblivious to the queries. Finally, the CS returns
the list of pseudo-identifiers corresponding to the match-
ing subscribers. Although this leaks both the search and
access patterns as defined in Sect. 6, the CS is neverthe-
less oblivious to the responses since neither the identities
of the actual subscribers nor their traits and demographics
are revealed.
7.4 Trapdoor nontransferability
The trapdoor nontransferability protocol is designed to pre-
vent advertisers from sharing their trapdoors with other
parties (or using other parties’ trapdoors in their queries).
This protocol stipulates that the advertiser submits a proof
of ownership for the trapdoors in its queries. Initially the
advertiser creates a single secure index T , for all the
trapdoors he purchased as described in Algorithm 1. The
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IPTV creates a signature for this secure index and sends it
to the advertiser. Whenever the advertiser wants to make
a query, the combined index of the purchased trapdoors
and its signature are both sent to the CS together with
the query. The CS first verifies the signature and tests
whether the query is generated from a subset of the trap-
doors in T . The search is applied only if both tests are
verified.
Note that the signature is generated only once for each
advertiser after obtaining trapdoors. However, the CS verifies
the signature before each query.
Algorithm 1 Trapdoor Nontransferability Protocol
1: Keys of Participants:
2: PUX - public key of the party X
3: PRX - private key of the party X
4:
5: IPTV:
Require: trapdoors (T1, T2, . . . , Tt ) requested by an advertiser, corre-
sponding to the keywords (w1, w2, . . . , wt )
6: T = ti=1Ti
7: = { jr−1 . . . j0}
8: {signature of the purchased trapdoors}
9: S = SIGNPRI PT V (T, PUADV )
10: send (S, T ) to advertiser
11:
12: Advertiser:
Require: keyword list for query {w1, w2, . . . , wδ}
13: if S is valid then
14: I q = δi=1Ti
15: send (S, T ) and I q to CS
16: end if
17:
18: CS:
19: if S is valid then
20: {this loop checks if I q ⊆ T }
21: for all i ∈ [0, . . . , r − 1] do
22: if I qi = 0 ∧ ji = 0 then
23: {advertiser not authorized for querying I q}
24: abort
25: end if
26: end for
27: Generate response R by performing I q on the data set
28: Select a random k as symmetric key
29: send ENCPUADV (k) and ENCk(R) to advertiser
30: end if
31:
32: Advertiser:
33: k = DECPRADV (ENCPUADV (k))
34: R = DECk (ENCk(R))
The trapdoor nontransferability property also allows
advertiser revocation. If the contract of an advertiser is
expired or for any other reason needs to be revoked, the
public key of that advertiser is removed from the CS
side. Therefore, the old signature cannot be verified and
the corresponding query will not be processed by the
CS.
7.5 Fake profile generation
As mentioned in Sect. 5.3, the IPTV can obfuscate the data
by adding some fake profiles to the database. Then, both
genuine and fake profiles are sent to the CS after encryption.
This obfuscation is used to prevent the CS from learning
keywords in a query from the statistics of the database. A
fake profile is added, if the frequency of an attribute a in
the profiles is not within the range [t1, t2], where t1 and t2
are predefined thresholds. The frequency of an attribute a is
calculated as:
f qa = # of profiles containing a
total number of profiles (fake + genuine)
.
Whenever the CS searches for a query over encrypted data,
the fake profiles are also included in the query results, but
only genuine profiles are revealed to the advertisers. The
algorithm used to create fake profiles is illustrated in Algo-
rithm 2.
Attributes with smaller frequency have greater probabil-
ity to appear in the fake profiles. At each iteration, a block
of θ fake profiles is generated in order to reduce the number
of while condition checks and hence increase the efficiency.
As the attributes in the fake profiles are chosen from the
ones with frequencies smaller than t1, only the frequencies
of attributes that are smaller than t1 increase, while all the
others decrease. There may be a case that the frequency of an
attribute, which is initially greater than t1, decreases below
the threshold after the addition of fake profiles. Then, this
attribute becomes a candidate for the fake profile addition
in the next iteration. A threshold can be used for the max-
imum number of iterations to guarantee termination of the
algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Fake profile generation
Require: thresholds t1,t2
A: the set of all possible values for all attributes
1: for all ai ∈ A do
2: IPTV calculates f qai
3: end for
4: while ∃ai ∈ A such that f qai < t1 OR f qai > t2 do
5: for all ai such that f qai < t1 do
6: calculate P ′ai = t1 − f qai
7: end for
8: for i = 1 → θ do
9: Create a fake profile such that attributes that has larger P ′ai have
higher chance to be appeared in the profile. Each profile contains
5 levels such that number of keywords in each level of a profile
are selected with respect to the distribution in the original data
set.
10: i ← i + 1
11: end for
12: ∀ai ∈ A, recalculate f qai
13: end while
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The pseudocode of the overall protocol is illustrated in
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Privacy-Preserving Advertising Scheme
1: IPTV: (offline stage)
Require: raw data of subscribers (D)
2: D′ = anonymize(D) {cf. Sect. 5.2}
3: D′′ = FakeProf Gen(D′) {cf. Sect. 7.5}
4: I = GenIndex(D′′) {cf. Sect. 7.2}
5: send I to CS
6:
7: Advertiser:
Require: keyword list for the requested trapdoors (w1, w2, . . . , wt )
8: send keyword list to IPTV and request corresponding trapdoors
9:
10: IPTV:
Require: keyword list (w1, w2, . . . , wt ) from advertiser
11: generate trapdoors (T1, T2, . . . , Tt ) requested by the advertiser, cor-
responding to the keywords (w1, w2, . . . , wt )
12: {trapdoor generation is given in Sect. 7.2}
13: create S and T { cf. Algorithm 1}
14: send ((T1, T2, . . . , Tt ), S, T ) to advertiser
15:
16: Advertiser:
Require: ((T1, T2, . . . , Tt ), S, T ) and keyword list for query
{w1, w2, . . . , wδ}
17: validate S and create query I q {cf. Algorithm 1}
18: send (S, T, I q ) to CS
19:
20: CS:
21: validate S and check if I q ⊆ T {cf. Algorithm 1}
22: for all Ii ∈ I do
23: calculate result (Ii , I q ) {cf. Sect. 7.3}
24: end for
25: Generate response R by selecting the positive results
26: Select a random k as symmetric key
27: send ENCPUADV (k) and ENCk(R) to advertiser
28:
29: Advertiser:
30: k = DECPRADV (ENCPUADV (k))
31: R = DECk (ENCk(R))
8 A stronger protection scheme in the presence of
background knowledge
In this section, we explain a key technique to provide a
stronger protection for the case, where there is some back-
ground knowledge on subscribers or the statistical model of
the data set.
To protect the privacy of subscribers’ data, the IPTV has
to anonymize the data before uploading it to the CS. If the
data are not anonymized properly, an advertiser who obtains
all the keywords from the IPTV can easily obtain profiles
of the subscribers by aggregating the result of queries. Prac-
tical anonymization techniques do not eliminate the risks
completely. An adversary who has access to the anonymized
database and some auxiliary information about a subscriber
can identify a record in the anonymized database and learn
the complete viewing history [28]. The advertiser can learn
the pseudonym of a target subscriber and compile his com-
plete viewing history by asking related queries. Therefore, in
such cases it is safer to provide only some statistical knowl-
edge about the result of a query, instead of returning the
pseudonyms of subscribers. Using only statistical knowl-
edge, an advertiser is not able to track a specific subscriber
and learn additional information.
For reducing privacy risks, in addition to the index of a
profile, some statistical information (e.g., age, gender, occu-
pation, etc.) is also encryptedusing a cryptographic algorithm
with homomorphic properties [29] before uploading the data
to the CS. Whenever the CS receives a query, utilizing the
homomorphic properties, encrypted sum of statistical infor-
mation is calculated by the CS. Then the encrypted statistics
are returned to the advertiser, which are, in fact, aggregated
data. As an example, statistics of a query result can include
female and male distribution of the matching profiles. In the
MovieLens data set, we consider genuine/fake, female/male,
age and occupation attributes as the statistical information.
Moreover, the security can further be increased by separat-
ing the statistics of more sensitive features from the others.
While the aggregated results of sensitive data are returned
only if the number of matching profiles is sufficiently high,
the aggregated results of the features, which are not con-
sidered to be sensitive, can always be returned independent
from the number of matching profiles. As an example, we
can separate occupation, which is arbitrarily assumed to be
more sensitive than gender and age. Statistical information
of a subscriber i is represented as:
Si1 = (Pi1||Pi2|| . . . ||Pin1) (9)
Si2 = (P¯i1||P¯i2|| . . . ||P¯in2), (10)
where each of Pik and P¯ik parts is a t-bit integer, representing
statistical information of a subscriber i and n1, n2 are the
number of fields in the corresponding statistical information.
For example, let in Eq. (9), there be seven fields (i.e.,
n1 = 7). Pi1 shows whether a subscriber is genuine or fake,
Pi2 and Pi3 specify if subscriber is female or male. The four
anonymized ranges of ages, namely (0-24), (25-44), (45-64)
and (65+) are represented in Pi4 to Pi7, respectively. In addi-
tion, let there be 21 different occupations, which are more
sensitive and hence represented in Si2 by P¯i1 . . . P¯i21 as in
Eq. (10). Since each subscriber is assumed to have a single
occupation, only the P¯ik field, corresponding to the occupa-
tion of the ith subscriber, is set to one, while the rest of the
fields are set to zero.
The IPTV encrypts Si1 and Si2 separately for all sub-
scribers, using the (homomorphic) Paillier encryption [30]
as shown in Eq. (11), where modulus n and the base g ∈ Z∗
n2
are the public keys and r ∈R Z∗n is a random number that
will be different at each encryption.
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E(Si1) = gSi1 · rn mod n2
E(Si2) = gSi2 · rn mod n2 (11)
Then, the IPTV sends the encrypted information along
with the indexes of the profiles to the CS.
TheCS calculates the aggregated data for the set ofmatch-
ing subscribers. Let R be the number of subscriber profiles
matched with the query, the encrypted aggregated results S j
are calculated by multiplying the encrypted value Si j of each
subscriber i . Note that due the homomorphic properties of
the Paillier encryption method, the following equations on
the encrypted data holds.
S1 =
R∏
i=1
E(Si1) = E
⎛
⎝
R∑
i=1
Si1
⎞
⎠
= E
⎛
⎝
R∑
i=1
Pi1||
R∑
i=1
Pi2|| . . . ||
R∑
i=1
Pin1
⎞
⎠
S2 =
R∏
i=1
E(Si2) = E
⎛
⎝
R∑
i=1
Si2
⎞
⎠
= E
⎛
⎝
R∑
i=1
P¯i1||
R∑
i=1
P¯i2|| . . . ||
R∑
i=1
P¯in2
⎞
⎠ (12)
Here Si j is the statistics of a matching subscriber i and j ∈
{1, 2} is the representative of each statistic as described in
Eqs. (9) and (10). Although each Pik and P¯ik keeps a single
bit information, t bits are reserved for each of them. Each S j
is aggregated according to the summation in Eq. (12); hence,
the extra reserved space prevents any overflow from one part
in S j to the prior part during the aggregation.
The value of t can be set depending on the size of the data
set. We assume that the number of matching subscribers will
be less than 216; hence, in our experiments we set t = 16.
However, the number of bits for each field can trivially be
increased depending on the size of the data set. As a common
message space for the Paillier encryption is 1024 bits, up to
50 bits per field can be used if required and this will have no
effect on the time or space complexity of the system.
Advertiser can learn the statistics of the returned results by
decrypting the encryption in Eq. (12). In order to decrypt the
statistics, the IPTV needs to share the private key of the Pail-
lier encryption with the advertisers. The IPTV sends this key
to an authorized advertiser after encrypting with the public
key of that advertiser that is also used in the trapdoor learning
procedure given in Algorithm 1 and this is done only once
per advertiser. Note that, due to the homomorphic proper-
ties of the Paillier cryptosystem, the encryption operations
in Eq. (11) are only modular multiplications and thus can be
performed very efficiently.
8.1 Privacy rules applied to returned statistics
on sensitive attributes
Depending on sensitive attributes in the system, some pri-
vacy rules must be applied before returning any statistics
about them. For instance, an advertiser (possibly with back-
ground knowledge) can arrange his query in such a way that
only a unique subscriber matches. In this case, returning the
sensitive attribute of the subscriber violates his privacy. We
specify a threshold such that the values for sensitive attributes
are returned to the advertiser only if the number of subscribers
that match to a given query is greater than the threshold. In
a sense, we apply a privacy rule similar to k-anonymity, in
which response to every query should contain at least k pro-
files in order to return sensitive attributes.
The number of matching profiles alone, however, cannot
determine the threshold since the matching profiles may not
be sufficiently diverse in terms of sensitive attributes. For
example, if all the subscribers in the set of matching pro-
files have the same occupation, returning statistics about the
occupation attribute may violate the privacy of a subscriber
with that occupation. The privacy rule, known as l-diversity,
guarantees a sufficiently diverse set in terms of sensitive
attributes. The number of subscribers matching to a query
should be a relatively large integer T > k to satisfy both
k-anonymity and l-diversity. There is a trade-off between
privacy and loss of information since higher threshold val-
ues mean better privacy, but less accuracy. However, our
scheme does not really suffer from loss of accuracy since the
advertisements are still sent to subscribers; only the adver-
tiser does not learn sensitive information about the matching
profiles except for the cardinality of the set of matching sub-
scribers.
We experimentally determine an optimal value for the
threshold T by making one million queries where two
randomkeywords are assigned to each query from theMovie-
Lens data set. Assuming that occupation and movie rating by
subscribers (rank attribute) are sensitive attributes, we keep
track of the number of matches and diversity in the sensi-
tive attributes for each query. In Figs. 2 and 3, we present the
histograms for diversity of occupation and rank for 1 mil-
lion random queries with respect to the number of matches.
The higher the number of matches, the higher the diversity
for occupation and rank is. These results demonstrate that
an optimal value for the threshold T is 13, which provides
sufficient diversity for sensitive attributes.
Nevertheless, one needs to be careful about the rank
attribute. The value for rank attribute is a number between 1
and 5. Statistics of ranks will be returned in the form Rank
1: N1, Rank 2: N2 . . . , Rank 5: N5, where Ni is the number
of subscribers who give rate i to a queried movie (or set of
movies). We can follow the l-diversity rule on rank results,
where the value for l can be a number between 2 and 5. The
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Fig. 2 Frequency of diversity
of occupation with respect to the
number of matches for 1 million
random queries
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Fig. 3 Frequency of diversity
of ranks with respect to the
number of matches for 1 million
random queries
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statistics about ranks are only returned if rank diversity is
greater than or equal to l.
From Figs. 2 and 3, setting the threshold T = 13 satisfies
2-diversity property (i.e., l = 2) for both occupation and rank
diversity as none of the matches has an occupation or rank
diversity less than l (i.e., 2).
9 Collaborative filtering over encrypted data
One of themost difficult datamining operations in our setting
is collaborative filtering over encrypted data. In this sec-
tion, the computation of collaborative filtering is explained
in detail. As it is explained in Sect. 5.1.2, Eq. (3) is used to
predict a rating of subscriber s on an IPTV content m (i.e.,
P(s,m)). TheCS,which is supposed to calculate predictions,
cannot identify the fake subscribers in the data set. There-
fore, the predictions can be faulty if these fake subscribers
are considered. Thus, we have to provide a technique that
eliminates the effects of fake subscribers. The information
of a subscriber being fake or genuine is first encrypted by
the IPTV and provided to the CS in encrypted form. The
CS calculates the prediction for a subscriber s (i.e., P(s,m))
as in Eq. (3). The predictions are calculated utilizing homo-
morphic operations. Each of the three parts of the equation
is calculated separately as given in Eqs. (13), (14) and (15)
and then combined as given in Eq. (16), where U is the set
of subscribers that rate the movie m and s /∈ U . Note that
Ru,m is the rating of a subscriber u on content m, R¯u is the
average rating of a subscriber u and ρ(s, u) is the similarity
between subscribers s and u.
E
⎛
⎝
∑
ui∈U
(Fui · |ρ(s, ui ) · (Rui ,m − R¯ui )|)
⎞
⎠
=
∏
ui∈U
E(Fui )
|ρ(s,ui )·(Rui ,m−R¯ui )| (13)
E
⎛
⎝
∑
ui∈U
(Fui · |ρ(s, ui )|)
⎞
⎠ =
∏
ui∈U
E(Fui )
|ρ(s,ui )| (14)
E
⎛
⎝R¯s ·
∑
ui∈U
|ρ(s, ui )|
⎞
⎠ =
∏
ui∈U
E(Fs · (R¯s · |ρ(s, ui )|))
=
∏
ui∈U
E(Fs)
R¯s ·|ρ(s,ui )|. (15)
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Here Fi is fake/genuine indicator for a subscriber i (i.e.,
Fui = 0 if the profile is fake, 1 otherwise). The fake/genuine
indicator allows the CS to eliminate the effect of fake
subscribers without learning any information about fake sub-
scribers. If Fi = 0, meaning that the subscriber with index
i is fake, its ratings will have no effect on the aggregated
result since they are multiplied with zero. It is important to
emphasize that the encryption used for hiding Fi is proba-
bilistic, so different encryptions of the same message with
the same key produce different cipher texts. Hence, the CS
cannot differentiate encrypted values of 0 from encrypted
values of 1.
Recall that P(s,m), which is the predicted rating of a
subscriber s on content m, is calculated as in Sect. 5.1.2,
P(s,m) = R¯s ·
∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|
+
∑
ui∈U ρ(s, ui ) · (|Rui ,m − R¯ui |)∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|
.
Then the server calculates the encrypted prediction for the
subscriber s as:
E(P(s,m))
=
E
((
R¯s
∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|
)
+
(∑
ui∈U ρ (s, ui )
(∣
∣Rui ,m−R¯ui
∣
∣
)))
E
(∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|
)
=
E
(
R¯s
∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|
)
E
(∑
ui∈U ρ (s, ui )
(∣
∣Rui ,m − R¯ui
∣
∣
))
E
(∑
ui∈U |ρ(s, ui )|
)
= E (num(P(s,m)))
E (denom(P(s,m)))
. (16)
Encrypted nominator and denominator of E(P(s,m)) are
calculated as follows:
E(num(P(s,m)))
=
∏
ui∈U
E(Fs)
R¯s ·|ρ(s,ui )| · E(Fui )ρ(s,ui )·(Rui ,m−R¯ui ) (17)
E(denom(P(s,m))) =
∏
ui∈U
E(Fui )
|ρ(s,ui )|, (18)
Encrypted nominator and denominator of P(s,m) (i.e.,
Eqs. 17, 18) are returned by the CS separately. By decrypt-
ing those two equations, an advertiser can compute P(s,m)
for subscribers s ∈ Uc, where the set Uc includes sub-
scribers s /∈ U . Note that s ∈ Uc are the pseudonyms for
the subscribers who are the potential targets for the content
m. The steps of the privacy-preserving collaborative filtering
are given in Algorithm 4.
While calculating the predictions in collaborative filtering,
the proposed method uses the same secure index structure
as in the targeted advertising. The only extra information
Algorithm 4 Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Filtering
for all keyword j ∈ J do
Advertiser sends the query Q j corresponding to keyword j to CS
end for
Advertiser sends the query Qm corresponding to the keywordm /∈ J
to CS
for all keywords j ∈ J and m /∈ J do
CS performs oblivious search operations
end for
CS determines U and Uc from search results
CS calculates R¯u
for all s ∈ Uc do
CS calculates R¯s
CS calculates ρ(s, u)
CS calculates E(num(P(s,m))) and E(denom(P(s,m))) and
sends them to advertiser
end for
for all s ∈ Uc do
Advertiser performs the decryption and calculates P(s,m).
end for
Advertiser selects the genuine subscribers inUc with high prediction
values
required is the encrypted fake/genuine identifier per sub-
scriber (i.e., Fi ). The values ρ(s, ui ), R¯ui and Rui ,m are
calculated by the advertiser, as follows: when the advertiser
applies search with the trapdoor for a content m, the list of
subscribers matching with m is received by the advertiser
together with the corresponding ranks. By applying separate
searches for different contents, the rates of subscribers on
each content (i.e., Rui ,m) can be found, which are then used
to find the average rating of each subscriber (i.e., R¯ui ) and
also the list of subscribers in the two sets U and Uc. The
similarity between two subscribers s ∈ Uc and u ∈ U (i.e.,
ρ(s, u)) is then calculated using these ratings. The following
example demonstrates the collaborative filtering process.
Example 4 Suppose that there are four movies as: m1 =
“Brazil,” m2 = “Liar Liar,” m3 = “Barcelona” and m4 =
“Smoke.” An advertiser would like to learn a prediction for
subscribers who watched the first three movies, but not the
forth. To do so, four queries, each containing one of the
movies, are generated separately. The results of these queries
are aggregated to generate a matrix which is partially shown
in Table1. According to this matrix, the CS can identify two
sets of subscribers. The first set U = {308, 1015, 1019, ...}
contains the subscribers who rated all 4 movies, and the sec-
ond set Uc = {151, 624, ...} consists of the subscribers who
rated the first threemovies but not the forth, thusU∩Uc = ∅.
Then for each s ∈ Uc, the CS calculates Eqs. (17) and (18),
where m is m4=“Smoke” and sends the results to the adver-
tiser. If there exists a fake subscriber u ∈ U , then Fu will be
0, which eliminates its effect on the prediction. The adver-
tiser can learn the prediction for each subscriber in Uc by
dividing the corresponding results from the CS as shown in
Eq. (16). The CS is not aware of which subscribers are fake
or genuine, and the advertiser cannot gain any information
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Table 1 Matrix of queries’
results
ID m1 m2 m3 m4
151 5 4 4
308 5 3 3 5
624 2 5 5
1015 5 2 3 4
1019 5 3 3 2
... ... ... ... ...
about the subscribers’ ratings, other than the value for the
prediction.
10 Privacy arguments
Here we argue that the proposed scheme addresses the pri-
vacy requirements in the setting defined inSect. 6.We assume
that the database schema (i.e., keywords) is known, but the
adversary does not know the mapping between the keywords
and trapdoors. We further assume that the statistical model
of the database is initially known only by the data controller
(IPTV). We analyze the security of the system against an
adversary that can access all the communication between any
two parties. Moreover, adversary may have some a-priory
information on the data set such as the database size (i.e.,
number of profiles) and distribution statistics of separate
attributes. The adversary also has access to the searchable
index. In other words, the CS is the adversary, which is the
strongest possible adversary in our setting.
Theorem 1 The privacy-preserving targeted advertising
scheme provides trapdoor nontransferability in accordance
with Definition 1.
Proof The trapdoor nontransferability protocol, which is
explained in Sect. 7.4, prevents advertisers from utilizing
unauthorized trapdoors in their queries. The index in the
IPTV signature allows the CS to identify if the keywords in
a given query indeed belong to the advertiser. This prevents
an advertiser from querying the database with the keyword
he/she did not own. Furthermore, the advertiser id in the
IPTV signature allows the CS to identify which advertiser
purchased the access to the database. The encryption that
the CS uses prevents an advertiser A from selling keywords
to another advertiser B. Indeed if advertiser B purchases
keywords from the advertiser A rather than the IPTV, then
either advertiser B has to reveal its query to advertiser A or
advertiser A has to give its private key to advertiser B. In
either case, one of the advertisers may be leaking some non-
trivial information about their advertising strategies via their
queries to a competitor. Thus advertisers have no incentives
to collude against the IPTV.
Since the CS’s response is encrypted using the advertiser’s
public key, only the designated advertiser learns the informa-
tion transferred. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides
trapdoor nontransferability. unionsq
Theorem 2 The privacy-preserving targeted advertising
scheme provides access control in accordance with Defin-
ition 2.
Proof Each query of advertisers is authenticated by the sig-
nature of the advertisers’ private key. Assuming that the
private keys of advertisers are not compromised, the proba-
bility of impersonating a registered advertiser is equal to the
probability of breaking the underlying cryptographic signa-
ture scheme. At present, an RSA public key of at least 1024
bits would suffice to guarantee access control. unionsq
Theorem 3 The privacy-preserving targeted advertising
scheme provides statistical privacy in accordance with Def-
inition 3.
Proof The addition of fake profiles, explained in Sect. 5.3,
obfuscates the original distribution statistics of each attribute.
After the addition of fake profiles, the occurrence of each
attribute in the data set is guaranteed to be in the inter-
val [t1, t2], for two threshold parameters t1 and t2 such
that 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < 1. Given that the occurrence rates
of all attributes are obfuscated to be in the secure interval
[t1, t2], it is not possible for an adversary to map original
distribution statistics of the data set to the distribution sta-
tistics of a query. Moreover, the generated fake profiles are
indistinguishable fromgenuine profiles and adversary cannot
learn the original distribution from the obfuscated distribu-
tion.Hence, the proposed schemeprovides statistical privacy.
unionsq
We assume that the adversary has only access to dis-
tribution statistics of single attributes. In the case that the
adversary has the knowledge of a joint occurrence (e.g.,
distribution statistics for age and gender such as “females
that are younger than 25”), the obfuscation method may not
hide all original occurrence rates. However, obfuscating each
single attribute also changes the original statistics of joint
occurrences.Moreover, leta be the number of attributes in the
data set, where each attribute ai can have ni different values.
The number of possible joint distributions with 2 variables
is calculated as:
|P(ai , a j )| =
∑
i, j∈Za s.t. i = j
(
ni × n j
)
.
This equation can be generalized for b variables such that
each product has b terms.Note that the number of joint occur-
rences increases as b and ni increase, which makes it even
harder to predict the chosen b variables. In Sect. 12.2, we
123
A practical privacy-preserving targeted advertising scheme for IPTV users 351
provide both the single and joint probability distributions for
the real data set used in our experiments and show that the
proposed obfuscation method hides the joint probability dis-
tributions up to a certain level.
Theorem 4 The privacy-preserving targeted advertising
scheme provides semantic security in accordance with Defi-
nition 9.
Proof Let the original view v(Hn) and the trace γ (Hn) be
v(Hn) ={(id(1), ..., id(l)),C, I,Q,sig(Q)}
γ (Hn) ={(id(1), ..., id(l)), (|C1|, ..., |Cl |), |sig(Q)|,
(||Q1||, . . . , ||Qn||), κ, ||I||, Sp(Hn), Ap(Hn)}.
Further let, v∗(Hn) = {(id∗(1), . . . , id∗(l)),C∗, I∗,Q∗,
sig(Q)∗} be the view simulated by the simulator S.
The proposed method is semantically secure if v(Hn) is
indistinguishable from v∗(Hn).
– The first component of the view v(Hn) is the document
identifiers id(i), which are also available in the trace.
Hence, S can trivially simulate document identifiers as
∀i id∗(i) = id(i). Since id∗(i) = id(i), they are indis-
tinguishable.
– Each subscriber identifier is encrypted using a pseudo-
randomness against chosen plaintext attack (PCPA)
secure encryption method (e.g., AES in CTRmode). The
output of a PCPA-secure encryption method [26] is by
definition indistinguishable from a random number that
has the same size with the ciphertext. To simulate cipher-
texts C , S assigns l random numbers to C∗ such that
C∗ = {C∗1 , . . . ,C∗l } where for all i, |C∗i | = |Ci |. Note
that size of each ciphertext is available in the trace. Con-
sidering for all i , Ci and C∗i are indistinguishable, C and
C∗ are also indistinguishable.
– The secure searchable index I is composed of index
entries for each genuine profile and fake profiles. Note
that each index entry is generated by applying “bit-
wise product” operation on the HMAC outputs of each
attribute value in the profile. S simulates searchable index
I, by generating ||I|| index entries using the HMAC
function with a random key S chooses. For each entry in
simulated I∗, S randomly selects a set of κ attributes and
applies the HMAC and the reduction methods accord-
ingly. An index entry in I∗ is generated with exactly the
same method as an entry in I other than the HMAC key.
Since HMAC was proved to be a secure pseudorandom
function (PRF) [31], an entry of I∗ is indistinguishable
from an entry in I. Moreover, both real index and simu-
lated index have the same number of index entries (i.e.,
||I|| = ||I∗||). Therefore, I is indistinguishable from
I∗.
– Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} is a set of n consecutive queries,
where each query Qi is a bitwise product of trapdoors
for the search keywords of Qi . ||Qi || is the number of
keywords in query Qi . Note that each trapdoor is an out-
put of the HMAC function which is a random bit string
of size r , where r
2d
bits are expected to be zero.
Simulator S generates Q∗ as follows. For each Q∗i , S
generates |Qi | random binary strings, where the number
of zero bits is a random number with mean r
2d
and take
the bitwise product of those ||Qi || strings to generate Q∗i .
The number of search terms ||Qi || is available in the trace.
Both Qi and Q∗i are bitwise products of same number of
bit stings of length r with same number of expected zeros.
Therefore, Qi and Q∗i are indistinguishable. Since for all
i , Qi and Q∗i are indistinguishable, Q and Q∗ are also
indistinguishable.
– TheRSA signature of a querysig(Qi ) is a random look-
ing number of size |sig(Qi )| (i.e., size of public key N )
which is available in trace γ (Hn). To simulatesig(Q), S
assign n randomnumbers of size |sig(Qi )| tosig(Q)∗.
∀i sig(Qi ) and sig(Qi )∗ are two indistinguishable
random numbers of same length. Hence, sig(Q) and
sig(Q)∗ are also indistinguishable.
The simulated view v∗ is indistinguishable from genuine
view v since each component of v and v∗ is indistinguishable.
Hence, the proposed method satisfies semantic security. unionsq
Theorem 5 The privacy-preserving targeted advertising
scheme is privacy-preserving in accordance with Defini-
tion 10.
Proof The proposed scheme provides semantic security,
statistical privacy, trapdoor nontransferability and access
control. Hence, it is a privacy-preserving targeted advertising
scheme under the semantic security model. unionsq
11 Complexity
We give the details on the complexity of the proposed
technique in this section. The communication and compu-
tational costs are evaluated separately. The notation is given
in Table2. The performance evaluation presented here only
serves to provide an intuition for the possible incurred cost.
11.1 Communication costs
Communication costs are given on basis of interactions
between the participants inTable3.Values inside the brackets
should be taken into account when the trapdoor nontransfer-
ability protocol, given in Sect. 7.4, is used, where the RSA
modulus is 1024 bits.
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Table 2 Notations
N Number of profiles
n Number of keywords in each profile for the given rank
t Number of obtained keywords by an advertiser
δ Number of keywords in a (multi-keyword) query
R Number of profiles matched with the query
α Number of subscribers for a specific advertisement
r Size of an index
h Hash digest length
η Number of rank levels
l Hash digest size
E(S j ) Encryption of statistics for subscriber j
Table 3 Communication costs incurred by each party in the proposed
system
Communication cost (bit)
IPTV-server Nrη (η ranking)
N · E(S)
IPTV-advertiser tr + [1024+r]
Advertiser-IPTV 32α (or encrypted pids) + advertisement
Advertiser-server r + [1024 + r ]
Server-advertiser Response (or encrypted statistics)+[1024]
– IPTV-Server communication. The IPTV sends profile
indexes to the server periodically (e.g., weekly), which is
Nrη bits in caseη levels are used for ranking. It also sends
ciphertexts in Eq. (11) (related to statistical information)
for each profile to the CS.
– IPTV-Advertiser communication. The IPTV sends the
trapdoors for the keywords to the advertiser. This com-
munication is repeated every time the advertiser asks for
new keywords or when the secret key of the IPTV is
changed.
The advertiser sends pseudo-identifiers (id) of target sub-
scribers and advertisement to the IPTV. Therefore, the
advertiser sends 32α bits to the IPTV assuming that
each id is a 32-bit integer, plus the content of the adver-
tisement. In case that statistical information is used,
a list of ids is encrypted by the CS and sent to the
advertiser.
– Advertiser-Server communication.Theadvertiser sends
an r -bit query index to the server. The server sends only
an anonymized id list as a response to the advertiser.
When ranking is used, η such lists are sent. In the case
that statistical information is used, server sends the result
of homomorphic encryption over the set of matched sub-
scribers to the advertiser.
Note that only the actual payloads are considered in the
communication costs given in Table3, omitting the overhead
data such as the message headers.
11.2 Computational costs
The computational cost for each party in the system is pre-
sented in this section.
– IPTV, creates profile indexes and Paillier encryption of
statistics periodically; it also generates trapdoors for each
advertiser.
– Advertiser, only prepares an index for a query which
involves bitwise product of trapdoors corresponding to
keywords in a conjunctive query. It also performs two
Paillier decryption operations to obtain statistics of the
matching profiles.
– Server, performs search operation, which is basically r -
bit binary comparisons of query indexeswith the database
entries. If ranking is used, the server performs atmost η-1
additional binary comparisons for each matching profile.
It also performs Paillier encryption (only modular mul-
tiplications) over a set of encrypted statistics of matched
subscribers.
Computational costs are summarized in Table 4. Values
inside the brackets should be taken into account when the
Table 4 Computational costs incurred by each party in the proposed
system
Computational costs (bit)
IPTV
∑ j=N
j=1
∑i=η
i=1(n × h-bit hash+n bitwise product of
r -bit string).
[for each advertiser:
t×(h-bit hash)+t bitwise prod. of r -bit trapdoors
1024-bit RSA signature.]
∑ j=N
j=1 E(S j )
Advertiser r bitwise prod. of δ trapdoors (conjunctive query)
[1024-bit RSA signature verification.
To get response:
RSA decryption of the symmetric key and
symmetric decryption of the response.]
Paillier decryption of returned results
[1024-bit RSA signature verification.
r binary comparisons.]
(without ranking)
N × r binary comparisons.
Server (with ranking)
N × r + (η − 1) × β × r binary comparisons.
One RSA Encryption of responses.
Paillier encryption over encrypted statistics of R
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trapdoor nontransferability protocol is used, where the RSA
modulus is 1024 bits.
12 Experimental setup
We provide the results obtained from two general experi-
mental setups. Our first experimental setup is based on the
synthetic data set created by our synthetic generator, whereby
we assume that the statistics of the data set is unknown to any
adversary. In this setting, the query results including match-
ing pseudo-ids are returned to the advertiser. In the second
experimental setup, we apply our method on the real data of
the MovieLens data set, assuming the availability of some
background knowledge on the data set statistics. In the lat-
ter case, only aggregate statistical data are returned to the
advertiser. All experiments are performed on a platform fea-
turing Windows 7 machine with Intel Xeon 6 Core running
at 3.2GHz.
The indexing method that we employ covers all the infor-
mation on keywords in a single r -bit index file. Independent
from the hash function, after reduction and bitwise product
operations, there is a possibility that index of a query may
wrongly match with an irrelevant profile. Two well-known
metrics for evaluating the success rate of a system are the
precision and recall rates.
Precision is the ratio of the number of retrieved items
that actually contains the queried terms to the number of
all retrieved items. In other words, it is the ratio of correct
matches to all matches.
Recall is the ratio of the number of retrieved items that
actually contain the queried terms to the number of all items
in the data set that contain the queried terms.
In our system, the recall rate is always one, meaning that
if a profile contains all of the keywords in the query, that
profile will definitely be a match to the query.
12.1 Experiments on synthetic data
The performance metrics such as efficiency and scalability
are tested by generating a synthetic data set which is suf-
ficiently large and diverse. Without loss of generality, we
consider a scenario, where the profile of each subscriber
consists of seven demographic features and eleven watching
preferences. The demographic features are age, gender, mar-
ital status, education, occupation, city and location, whose
values are the keywords in our scheme. Watching prefer-
ences enumerate the interest of an individual on a specific
IPTV content, which can be categorized as follows. Morn-
ing watching preferences are marriage, news and health
programs. Similarly, afternoon watching preferences are
marriage, TV series and sport programs, while prime-time
watchingpreferences are news, competition, series, talk show
and sport programs.4 Each watching preference is also taken
as a keyword in the proposed solution.
Our synthetic demographic profiles are assigned randomly
within the predefined categories (e.g., married, single, widow
or divorced for “marital status”), and watching habits are cal-
culated according to these demographic features. The value
for a program is a real number between 0 and 1, indicating the
rate of time the subscriber spends on watching the program
during a week. The sum of these numbers for each week and
for each subscriber must not exceed one.
We also speculate that watching habits of individuals
are correlated to their demographic features. Therefore, any
synthetic data should take into account such dependencies.
We use our custom-made probabilistic data generator. The
process conforms to some simple expectations about the
types of correlations that exist between demographic features
and watching preferences.
We performed experiments for the scenario where the
advertiser sends single- or multi-keyword queries to find
subscribers of matching profiles for an advertisement where
subscribers’ pseudonyms and their relevancy scores to the
queries are returned to the advertiser.
In the experiments, the HMAC function produces 300
bytes output, which is generated by concatenating different
length SHA2-based HMAC functions. We choose d = 5;
therefore, after reduction, the index size (r ) is 60 bytes (480
bits). The database has different number of subscribers vary-
ing from 5000 to 80,000 with each profile having at most 18
attributes (i.e., keywords).
12.1.1 Precision rate
Weevaluate the success rate of the system using the precision
metric. Note that the recall rate is always one in the proposed
method. While this test on the synthetic data is done only to
show how the number of keywords and the index entry size
of the profiles affect the precision rate, the precision is also
evaluated using a real data set and the actual success rate of
the system is presented in Sect. 12.2.
In Fig. 4, we compare the precision values of randomly
chosen queries containing one to five keywords over the syn-
thetic data set where profiles have 18, 28, 38 and 48 attributes
and index size (r ) is 480 bits. The precision rate decreases
rapidly after 38 attributes per profile due to the increase in
the number of zeros at the index file.
In order to gain a deeper insight, we extend our experi-
ment to test the relationship between the parameters. If more
attributes are required per profile, precision can be improved
by increasing the index size (i.e., choosing a longer HMAC
function) and choosing a larger base d. The precision rate
4 Afternoon sport and prime-time sport programs are independent
fields.
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given in Fig. 5 is calculated for 1040-bit index when d = 6.
We observe a significant improvement in the precision rate
compared to the rates given in Fig. 4 as the index size
increases.
As the number of keywords in the profiles increases, the
number of zeros in the index for profiles also increases,which
increases the chance of matching these profiles incorrectly.
This inevitably decreases the precision rate. However, further
increase in the number of keywords in a query will result in
fewer number of matches whichmay also have some positive
effect on the precision rate.
12.1.2 Timing results for construction
Timing results for the secure index construction operations,
performed on the IPTV side, are presented in Fig. 6. Note
that these operations are only performed periodically (e.g.,
weekly) and the index construction method can be trivially
parallelized. Therefore, the presented technique is practical
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Fig. 6 Timings for index construction with 18 keywords per profile
(on IPTV side)
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Fig. 7 Timings for query search with and without ranking (on the CS
side)
and efficient from the perspective of the IPTV. Timing results
for index generation with parallelization, utilizing all the six
cores in the platform are illustrated by dashed lines in Fig. 6.
Timing results on the server side for the search operation,
with and without ranking, indicate relatively low latency as
shown in Fig. 7. Timings for query search when using the
trapdoor nontransferability protocol are also illustrated by
dashed lines in Fig. 7, which is also relatively low. Note that
the signature verification operation in the protocol, which
dominates the timing, does not have to be performed every
time. Therefore, the scheme is also efficient from the per-
spective of the CS. Query generation by an advertiser takes
negligible amount of time and therefore omitted here.
12.1.3 Timing results for data mining algorithms
We have performed two experiments to demonstrate the effi-
ciency of the two most common data mining algorithms in
our setting, namely clustering and content-based filtering.
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Table 5 Timing results for obtaining the entire demographic data used
in clustering based on demographics
Number
of profiles
Advertiser
total time (ms)
CS query
search time (ms)
Communication
time (ms)
5000 164 58 106
10,000 422 112 310
20,000 656 219 437
40,000 1345 451 894
80,000 2639 1185 1454
Table 6 Time for content-based filtering with five attributes
Number of profiles Prediction time (ms)
5000 15
10,000 40
20,000 207
40,000 599
80,000 2249
Clustering
Advertisers can use demographic filtering [21] to categorize
subscribers based on their demographics and send adver-
tisements accordingly. Since there are seven demographic
features in our data model and total number of keywords
pertaining to the demographic features is 42, the adver-
tiser sends a total of 42 different (single keyword) queries
to obtain the information about subscribers’ demographics.
Then the advertiser can utilize the results of queries to gener-
ate a relevant segmentation for his advertising purpose. This
experiment is implemented using a reliable socket commu-
nication (i.e., TCP) on the same computer.
The timing results are presented in Table5 for different
number of subscribers. While the second column lists the
total elapsed time for the advertiser, the third column indi-
cates the time the CS spends during the entire process. The
last column shows the time spent on the communication.
Note that the time spent for the actual clustering algorithm
is not reported here.
Content-Based Filtering
The advertising agency can use content-based filtering tech-
nique [21], as described in Sect. 5.1.1, to send advertisements
to related subscribers. Each advertisement can be described
by attributes or characteristics of the products, which are the
subject of the advertisement. The advertiser uses a similarity
metric between the advertisement attributes and subscribers’
watching habits or demographics to predict their potential
interests in a specific advertisement.
The execution time spent by the advertiser to compute pre-
dictions of an advertisement with five attributes is illustrated
in Table6 for various data set sizes.
12.2 Experiments on real data
We also performed a number of experiments using a real data
set, for the scenario where the advertiser sends queries to the
CS and only statistics of results are returned to advertiser.
We used the MovieLens data set [25] as the real data since
there are no published IPTV data that can be used for scien-
tific purposes. The properties of the MovieLens data set are
described in Sect. 7.1.
Our experiments are conducted on movie-based and
genre-based versions of the MovieLens data set separately.
The genre-based data set is a relatively simple version, where
subscribers are mainly profiled according to their demo-
graphics and preferences of movie genres. The movie-based
implementation utilizes the full data set. The latter imple-
mentation, where there are more than 900 keywords, helps
to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in an
extreme case.
12.2.1 Genre-based implementation
In genre-based implementation, the profile of a subscriber is
generated according to the genres of movies that the sub-
scriber has rated. There are 18 genres in the MovieLens
data set, and each movie may have more than one genre. To
accommodate 1–5 scoremodel of theMovieLens data set, we
create five levels of index, whereby the subscribers’ interests
increase by each level. We employ a method to determine
the genres that will be in each level of a subscriber profile as
follows.
First, the frequency of genres of movies rated as i by a
subscriber is calculated for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. Then the
interest of a subscriber s for each genre is calculated as in
the Eq. (19).
I nterest( j,s) = 1
ω
5∑
i=1
f req ji × i (19)
Here f req ji is the frequency of the genre j , which is rated
as i by the subscriber s. Also, j is the index of a genre, and ω
is the total number of movies that is rated by the subscriber
s. After calculating the interest rates of the subscriber for all
genres, the interest level of genres in the subscriber’s profile
is set by comparing the calculated rates with the thresholds
in Table7. Note that these thresholds can be chosen in any
arbitrary way.
Example 5 Let the frequencies of movie genres rated by the
subscriber s1 be as inTable8 and total number ofmovies rated
by this subscriber be 52. The interest rate of s1 in drama and
animation genres is calculated as follows:
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Table 7 Thresholds for interest
rate
Interest rate Level
1.5 ≤ interest 5
1 ≤ interest < 1.5 4
0.2 ≤ interest < 1 3
0.1 ≤ interest < 0.2 2
0 < interest < 0.1 1
Table 8 Example of frequencies of genres given by a subscriber s1
Drama Animation Musical War
Rate 1 0 0 0 0
Rate 2 0 0 0 0
Rate 3 0 4 2 0
Rate 4 12 8 6 0
Rate 5 9 6 6 2
I nterest(drama,s1) =
1
52
[12 × 4 + 9 × 5] = 1.78
I nterest(animation,s1) =
1
52
[4 × 3 + 8 × 4 + 6 × 5]=1.42
(20)
According to the thresholds given in Table7, animation and
drama genres are placed in levels 4 and 5, respectively.
The proposed method also enables the advertiser to spec-
ify interest level in his queries, in addition to the keywords.
For instance, the advertiser can generate a query for sub-
scribers who are interested in drama genre with degree 5.
The following figures are used in the experiments: The
index size is chosen as 402 bytes, while the minimum and
maximum numbers of keywords in a profile turn out to be
5 and 23, respectively. Reduction size is selected as d = 8.
There are 6040 subscribers with 5 level scoring; thus, the
number of indexes generated by the IPTV is 5 × 6040 =
30200. It takes 1.94 m to generate all the indexes and 30 s
to generate encrypted statistics in Eqs. (11) and (12). Using
parallelization, the index generation time is reduced to 38 s
using six cores. Time for generating a query is negligible and
both precision and recall rates for the queries are found to be
1.
Recall that the IPTV obfuscates the data by adding some
fake profiles as explained in Sect. 7.5. Whenever the CS
searches for a query over encrypted data, the fake profiles
are also included in the query results, but only genuine pro-
files are revealed to the advertiser.We select genre-based data
set to insert fake profiles since it contains fewer number of
keywords in each profile.
When generating fake profiles, the aim is to eliminate
statistical bias for the keywords, where their occurrence fre-
quencies in the data set are known as background knowledge.
For this, we select a target interval for the frequency of a
keyword and add fake profiles until it reaches in this interval.
In our experiments, after inserting 12000 fake profiles, fre-
quencies of all keywords for each attribute (Age, Gender ,
Occupation and Genre) are brought into the targeted inter-
val. The probability distribution of keywords before and after
inserting fake profiles is demonstrated in Figs. 8, 9 and 10.
In our setting, due to efficiency reasons, we obfuscate age
groups and gender in one group, occupations and genres in
other groups. Hence, analyzing the search results, an adver-
sarymay learnwhether the query is for an occupation, a genre
or something else but cannot learn anything other than this.
For example, Fig. 8 illustrates that all keywords related to
gender and age have almost the same frequency after fake
profile insertion. It is difficult to distinguish a male from
female using the statistics. Similarly, probability distribu-
tions of all keywords pertaining to occupation fall in the
interval between 0 and 0.1 as can be observed in Fig. 9. A
similar case also exists in the keywords for the movie genres
as shown in Fig. 10.
The provided obfuscation method ensures that the fre-
quency of each single attribute is within a security range.
The adversary model that has the information of all joint
probability distributions is beyond the scope of this work.
Nevertheless, the insertion of fake profiles also perturbs the
joint distributions and those statistics can still be hidden with
this method up to a certain level. Note that the adversary can-
not trivially know the attributes used in the query. Let there
be a attributes in the data set, where each attribute ai can
have ni different values. The number of joint probability dis-
tributions with 2 variables is calculated using the function
given in Sect. 10 as:
|P(ai , a j )| = ∀i, j ∈ Za s.t. i = j
∑(
ni × n j
)
.
We analyze the effect of the proposed obfuscation method on
the joint probability distribution, using the MovieLens data
set. In the data set, there are four attributes (Age, Gender ,
Occupation and Genre) that have 2, 4, 21 and 18 values,
respectively. Hence, the number of joint probability distri-
butions with 2 variables is 620. Among those 620 joint
probabilities with 2 variables, after applying obfuscation, the
change in 486 of the probabilities is greater than 1%. The
average change is calculated as 2.2% where the maximum
change is 26%. These experimental results show that it is not
trivial to learn the keywords (i.e., attribute values) in queries
by correlating the statistics of the original data set with the
query results of the obfuscated data set.
The analysis do not consider the case of joint distributions
for three or more attributes, but it is important to note that
the number of possible joint distributions further increases as
the number of variables used gets larger. Moreover, any joint
probability distribution can further be obfuscated by increas-
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Fig. 10 Probability distribution
of values for genres attribute
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Do
cu
me
nta
ry
W
es
ter
n
Fil
m−
no
ir
Fa
nta
sy
My
ste
ry
Mu
sic
al
An
im
ati
on
Ho
rro
r
Ch
ild
ren W
ar
Cr
im
e
Ad
ve
ntu
re
Sc
i−f
i
Ro
mm
an
ce
Th
rill
er
Ac
tio
n
Co
me
dy
Dr
am
a
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Probability distribution of values for Genre attribute
Before inserting fakes
After inserting fakes
ing the number of fake profiles. However, there is a trade-off
between privacy and efficiency. The index generation time
and index size will both increase as number of fake profiles
increases.
In addition, the number of zeros in an index is a direct
function of the number of keywords in the corresponding
profile. Therefore, the CS may identify fake profiles in the
data set by inspecting the number of zeros in their indexes.
In order to prevent such an attack, keyword distribution (i.e.,
number of keywords in each profile) in fake profiles is set
statistically indistinguishable from those in genuine ones.
Figure11 demonstrates keyword distributions in indexes of
fake and genuine profiles. The Y axis represents the percent-
age of genuine and fake subscribers whose profiles contain
certain number of keywords as indicated in the X axis. The
figure shows that there is not a statistically significant differ-
ence between the number of keywords in genuine and fake
profiles; thus, it is hard to determine whether a given profile
is fake or genuine.
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Fig. 11 Keywords distribution
in level 1 between fake and
genuine profiles
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The timing results for fake profile generation show that it is
acceptable for practical usage. Using parallelization, it takes
1.93 m to generate all indexes (i.e., genuine+fake) and 71 s
to generate all statistics. Query generation takes negligible
amount of time.
12.2.2 Movie-based implementation
In the movie-based implementation, a profile of a subscriber
is generated using the movies rated by him and his demo-
graphics. We use a five-level index to accommodate the 1–5
rating scores used in the MovieLens data set. Whenever a
query contains multiple movies in a single query, only sub-
scribers who give the same rate to those movies will be
returned as a result. Therefore, sending one-keyword queries
is better for the accuracy. This way it can easily categorize
subscribers by their ratings to a movie. Index size is cho-
sen as 1202 bytes, which is longer than the previous case,
to provide accuracy for profiles that contain as many as 950
keywords. The minimum and maximum numbers of key-
words are 5 and 950, respectively. Reduction size is set as
d = 8.
The number of indexes that are generated by the IPTV is
5 × 6040 = 30200 (5 level rank with 6040 subscribers). It
takes about 30 m to generate all indexes and 40 s to gen-
erate all statistics. As in all the previous cases, the time it
takes to generate a query is negligible. Using parallelization
on a six-core computer, we can reduce the index generation
time approximately six times (reduced to 5 m). Note that the
index generation shows strong scalability, provided a suffi-
cient number of cores.
In Table9, we present the precision rates which are cal-
culated by taking average of 250 random queries when the
number of keywords in a query varies from 1 to 7. Note
that precision for one-keyword queries is quite high (about
0.922). The precision goes up to 1 with the increase in the
number of keywords in a query. Themain reason is that when
the number of queried keywords is high, it is hard to find any
real match in the data set whose profile contains all the key-
words in the query. We also enumerate the average search
Table 9 Precision rate and search time for a query
# of keywords in a query Precision rate Search time (ms)
1 0.922 71
2 0.77 58
3 0.80 55
4 0.90 54
5 0.96 54
6 0.98 53
7 1 53
times spent on queries with different number of keywords in
Table9.
Collaborative Filtering
Consider a scenario where the advertiser wants to send an
advertisement for the moviem4 to subscribersM1 who have
watched the movies {m1,m2,m3}, but not m4. For finding
appropriate subscribers, he first finds the subscribers M2
who have watched all four movies {m1,m2,m3,m4}. Then,
computes a prediction for each subscriber c ∈ M1, by calcu-
lating the correlation between c and each subscriber in M2.
Example 6 Suppose that {m1, . . . ,m4} are movies “Liar
liar,” “Brazil,” “Barcelona” and “Smoke” correspondingly,
which are chosen from the MovieLens data set. The adver-
tiser wants to recommend the movie “Smoke” to subscribers
who watched the other three movies. It turns out that there
are 29 subscribers in the MovieLens data set who have
watched the three movies and 16 of them have also watched
the fourth movie. Thus, the advertiser computes predictions
for the other 13 subscribers who have not watched the fourth
movie yet. Table10 shows predictions which are calculated
using the method described in Sect. 9. It takes the CS only
303 ms to compute predictions for the 13 subscribers for the
content m4. The advertiser can also select a threshold value
to send the advertisement to subscribers whose predictions
are greater than a given threshold.
The experiments in this section confirm that the proposed
method can be efficiently used even for extreme cases, where
the number of keywords in each profile is high.
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Table 10 Prediction for movie m4
SubscriberID m1 m2 m3 m4
151 5 4 4 3.40
624 2 5 5 3.20
1371 4 3 4 2.71
1983 5 4 5 3.70
2092 5 2 4 2.88
3054 5 2 3 2.58
3067 5 3 3 2.81
3128 5 4 5 2.49
3292 5 4 5 3.70
3371 5 2 3 3.11
4478 5 4 5 2.58
4728 4 4 3 2.750
4933 5 5 4 3.74
13 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we propose a practical, secure and privacy-
preserving targeted advertising service for the IPTV sub-
scribers. The proposed method can be implemented over a
cloud service due to the relaxed, semi-trusted assumption on
the server.
While the privacy of subscribers is protected, the adver-
tisements can be targeted to prospective customers with
accuracy since precision of themethod is quite high and recall
is 1 (i.e., perfect recall). The ratingmechanism adopted in our
solution targets only subscribers who demonstrate desired
relevance to queries. Furthermore, advertising agencies can
keep their strategies for reaching potential customers unex-
posed to the cloud server or other advertisers.
From the IPTV’s perspective, the proposed system has
many advantages. It allows outsourcing all the services per-
taining to advertisement without any adverse effect on the
security and privacy issues concerning its subscribers. Fur-
thermore, advertisers (or any other party who has access to
the database on the cloud) can utilize the data only if they
are authorized to do so. The IPTV can control the access to
the database in a fine-grained manner in the sense that the
advertiser can only access to the part of the database related
to keywords, for which he holds trapdoors.
The idea of returning statistics on aggregate data, instead
of fixed pseudonyms as query response, is useful when some
background information about the subscribers is available.
Without the proposed obfuscation method, analyzing the
background statistics may reveal the identity of subscriber
from the returned pseudonyms.Whenever the statisticsmight
disclose sensitive information, the flexibility in our system
allows the cloud server to return only partial information.
The fake subscribers that are inserted for obfuscating the data
set prevent the cloud server from identifying a specific sub-
scriber and/or learning any extra sensitive information about
him. The cloud server cannot distinguish genuine subscribers
from the fake ones which can match with queries and be only
identified by either the advertiser or the IPTV.
The algorithms used in index generation and query exe-
cution phases demonstrate strong scalability in terms of
parallelization. The experimental results show that speedups
proportional to the number of cores employed can be
achieved for both index generation and query execution
operations. This suggests that the proposed algorithms are
scalable and can efficiently be used even with large data
sets.
Lastly, the proposed system can be utilized in a recom-
mendation system as well. From a general perspective, in
our solution, the advertisement can be any product, service
or IPTV content (e.g., a movie, sitcom).
As a future work, we intend to adapt the proposed scheme
for Big Data applications, in which the size of the data set
and the data velocity are both very high. A possible solution
method can be utilizing extreme levels of parallelism on a
cluster of computers.
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